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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF CASE 
This appeal is from a case that involved three (3) construction projects, two (2) in 
Jefferson County, Idaho and one (1) in Fremont County Idaho. The Jefferson County Jobs were 
for construction work on the "Midway Middle School" and a "Water Booster Pump" project. 
Harris, Inc. (hereinafter "Harris") was the General contractor on all three (3) jobs. L.N. Johnson 
Paving, LLC (hereinafter "Johnson") and Foxhollow Construction & Trucking, Inc. (hereinafter 
"Foxhollow) were subconractors to Harris. Ferguson Farms d/b/a Ferguson Trucking were 
equipment suppliers to Foxhollow for use on Harris' jobs. D. Kym Ferguson and Michael 
Ferguson were minority stockholders and officers and directors in Foxhollow and partners in 
Ferguson Farms (hereinafter "Ferguson"). 
The Plaintiffs case against Kym Ferguson is based on the alleged fraud commited by 
Foxhollow by failure to turn in bills and invoices to Harris, that induced Harris to make progress 
payments to Johnson for work performed by Foxhollow. The fraud on the part of Ferguson was 
his alleged failure to advise Harris that Foxhollow was not turning in 3rd party equipment 
suppliers and materialmen's billings and invoices to Harris in a timely manner so Harris would 
be apprised of the outstanding claims against Foxhollow and could take that into account bet ore 
Han'is made a progress payment to Johnson. Harris did make progress payments to Johnson, but 
the work was actually performed by Foxhollow. Johnson paid over the progress payment to 
foxhollow. Harris and Dave Egan, Johnson's agent and Foxhollow's employee, put together this 
shell game to cover up the fact that Foxhollow did not have a public works license and could not 
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be on the school johs, so Harris paid Foxhollow's payroll and all of it's business expenses 
directly as though Foxhollow's employees and suppliers were Harris's employees and suppliers. 
Harris would then keep internal accounting records charging all of Foxhollow's expenses, that 
Harris \vas paymg, back to Foxhollow's sub-contract. The result was that the only place 
Foxhollow surfaced was on Harris' internal accounting records. First you see it then you don't. 
Scott Harris of Harris, Inc., explained that this procedure was followed in order to assure that all 
of Foxhollow's suppliers were paid, even though the sup-contract with Foxhollow required 
Foxhollow to pay all of its own suppliers. The procedure for turning in the billings for 
Foxhollow's suppliers was designed by Scott Harris and Dave Egan. Foxhollw's manager on the 
site was Melvin Voss and Harris' superintendent on the job was a man named Tony Robles. 
Melvin Voss, Foxhollow's manager, took his instructions from Tony Robles, Harris' 
superintendent and was paid by Harris. Suppliers were directed to tum in their billings to Melvin 
Voss, Foxhollovv's project manager on the job. Melvin Voss collected the billings to Foxhollow 
and then on the 1 st and the 15th , Melvin turned them into Tony Robles, completely bypassing 
FoxholIo-w's office, accountant and accounting records. Bessie Bradshaw, a construction 
accountant with 35 years expenence was employed by Foxhollow to keep Foxhollow's 
accounting records. Harris claims that Kyrn Ferguson should have advised Harris that 
Foxhollow's supplier billings were not being submitted, as Harris had planned. The only 
problem with this is that no one told Kyrn Ferguson how the system was supposed to work. 
Kym couldn't advise Harris of anything, because he didn't know biIlings were supposed to be 
turned in to Harris so they could be paid by Harris on behalf of Foxhollow. Ferguson could not 
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figure out why there was no money to pay Ferguson Trucking's equipment rental and payroll 
taxes. Ferguson Trucking's billings in the amount of $75,000,00 were piling up in Foxhollow's 
office and Ferguson, a Vice-President, and Bessie Bradshaw, Seetretary/Treasurer, did not know 
the billings were supposed to be turned into Harris. For Harris to prevail against Foxhollow, it 
has to prove all nine (9) elements of fraud by clear and convincing evidence, For Ferguson, as an 
officer and director in FoxholIow, to be held liable for Foxhollow's fraud, he had to specifically 
direct, actively participate in, or knowingly acquiesce in the fraud that Foxhollow was allegedly 
perpetrating, The Court below found Harris did not prove all of the elements of fraud against 
Foxhollow. [R. Vol. 6 p 1502] The court found that Harris did not prove any damages against any of the 
Defendants with reasonable certainty. The Court further found that Ferguson was not liable for 
Foxhollow's fraud as they did not prove ignorance of the falsity of the representations or the silence of 
I:;oxhollo\v and that Ferguson did no direct, actively participate in, or kno\vingly acquiesce in the alleged 
fraud that Foxhollow was perpetrating. [R. Vol. 6 p. 1503] 
COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Respondent Ferguson does not have any meaningful changes to Appellant's statement as 
to the course of the proceedings 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. DID THE COURT ERR IN RULING HARRIS FAILED TO PROVE DAMAGES 
2. DID THE COURT ERR IN REFUSING TO A WARD DAMAGES ON THE 
GROUNDS THAT THE EVIDENCE DID NOT SHOW WHETHER THE DAMAGES 
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WERE A RESULT OF THE JOHNSON CONTRACT OR THE FOXHOLLOW 
CONTRACT, OR BOTH? 
3. DID THE COURT ERR IN FINDING THAT THE PAYMENTS HARRIS SENT TO 
JOHNSON WERE NOT FOR JOHNSON'S WORK ON THE FEMONT PROJECT? 
4. DID TIlE COURT ERR IN HOLDING HARRIS FAILED TO PROVE THE GENERAL 
CONDITIONS WERE A PART OF THE SUBCONTRACT WITH JOHNSON AND 
FOXHOLLOW AND IN DENYING INDEMNIFICATION TO HARRIS? 
5. DID THE COURT ERR IN NOT AWARDING DAMAGES AGAINST FERGUSON? 
6. DID THE COURT ERR IN REFUSING TO ADMIT EXHIBIT 55/55-A? 
7. DID THE COURT ERR IN DENYING HARRIS' MOTION TO AMEND FINDINGS 
AND CONCLUSIONS? 
8. DID THE COURT ERR IN AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES AND COURT COSTS 
TO JOHNSON AGAINST HARRIS? 
9. DID THE COURT ERR IN AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES AND COURT COSTS 
TO FERGUSON AGAIN HARRIS? 
10. DID THE COURT ERR IN DENYING HARRIS' MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
11. THE RESPONDENT, FERGUSON IS ENTITLED TO, AND DOES REQUEST, 
ATTORNEY FEES AND COURT COSTS INCURRED IN THIS APPEAL 
PURSUANT TO I.A.R. 41 AND I.e. 12-120(3). 
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STATEMENT OFF ACTS 
Harris presented testimony from Tony Robles that at some point as he was acting 
superintendent on the Fremont job he became aware of a problems pertaining to the timely 
submIssion of pay requests and billings by Foxhollow and after having become aware of this 
problem, [ Tr. p. 446, LLL 4-7] Robles testified that he had a conversation with Kym Ferguson 
on August 28,2002. [ Tr. p. 444 LL. 21-2; p. 445, LL. 1-25; p. 446, LL. 1-7; p. 447, LL. 1-25; p. 
448, LL. 1-25 p 450, LL. 22-25; p. 451, LL 1-22;] Robles testified that Kym Ferguson "said he 
was one of the principals in Foxhollow" and "said they were withholding any pay requests and 
billings until thejob was complete by their, their scope of the work". [Tr. 452, LL. 21-25; p.453, 
LL. 1-21] Kym Ferguson denies that the conversation took place. [Tr. 573, LL.1-25; p. 574 LL. 
1-25; p. 575, LL. 1-5] 
Melv1l1 Voss testified that he had worked in the Construction industry for 20 to 25 years. 
[Tr. p. 626, LL23-25] Melvin testified that he was hired by Foxhollow, but he was paid by 
Harris Construction. [Tf". p. 627, LL 1-7] Melvin testified that he got his instructions from Tony 
Robles (Harris' Superintendent on the Fremont County job) and that his duties on the job were as 
the project manager, that he ran the job, directed all of the equipment, did the billing on the job, 
stufflike that. He testified that he recorded "what the equipment did, like ifit was a truck, I'd put 
dO\vn trucking, the name of the trucking company. I'd put down what, what it did for the day, 
what it hauled and stuff, and the hours". Melvin testified that he did this on every piece of 
equipment on the site. That was his job and it was to "record everything". [Tf'. p. 628, LL 5-25; 
p.629, LL. 1-6] He testified that when it came time for the equipment suppliers to turn in their 
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billings they turned them into him (Melvin Voss) and then he inturn would turn them into Tony 
Robles. That after he collected the billings from the equipment suppliers, they never left his 
possession until he gave them to Tony robles. [Tr. p. 629, LL. 7-13) When asked if he was on 
the North Fremont Job on a daily basis or just occasionally Melvin testified "No. I-it was 
daily. I was there from the first day the first piece of equiupment started up to the last day that 
the last piecc of eqUIpment left." In answer to the question "and each day you kept your log as to 
the equipment that was on the site, who owned the equipment and what work it did? Melvin 
answered YES," Melvin testified that he verified the bills from his log and turned them in to 
Tony Robles; That he turned the bills into Tony Robles on the 1 st and the 15th as Tony Robles 
requested, that way everybody could get their money on the 1st and the 15th [Tr. p. 629, LL. 22-
25: p. 630, LL. 1-15] Melvin testified that he never discussed any of the equipment billings with 
Kym Ferguson. [Tr. p.630, LL 16-18.] When asked, how often did you see Kym Ferguson on the 
site? Melvin answered "No, I never did see him there until towards the end of the job". In 
answer to the question: "would that have been in, in October after he brought his equipment back 
to the job site?" Melvin answered "yes". [Tr. p. 630, LL. 19-25] Melvin Voss testified that he 
could identify the equipment on the cite just by looking at it. In answer to the question "Now?" 
by looking at the equipment out there on the site, could you identify which equipment was rented 
from vvhich equipment supplier" Melvin Answered "yes" Q. 'And how did you do that?' 
Melvin answered "well, like Western Sates and that, they have their Logo right on the 
equipment; like Pro Rental, they do the same thing." [Tr. P. 637, LL 3-23] It is no wonder that 
Tony Robles became aware of the fact that Foxhollow was not turning in their billings in a 
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timely manner. Melvin Voss and Tony Robles were the only ones that saw the billings before 
they were tumed in to Harris. Foxhollow's office, nor Bessie Bradshaw, nor Kym Ferguson ever 
sa\V the billings if the suppliers tumed in their invoices to Voss pursuant to Harris' plan for 
handling incoming invoices and billings. 
Scott HaITis' only basis for his allegation that Kym Ferguson withheld billings from 
Harris was because Kym was a principal in Foxhollow. "And he had to know". [Tr. p. 262 LL. 
; p. 263 LL. 1-23] Harris testified that he was not paying Ferguson directly and that he knew 
that Ferguson had not been paid their equipment rental. [Tr. P. 264, L. 8 p. 267, L. 5] Scott 
Harris testified, upon being asked if he ever advised Kym Ferguson that billings were supposed 
to be tumed into Harris, he answered, "I told Dave Egan". 
[Tr. p. 264 LL 9-25; p. 265, LL. 1-25; p. 266, LL.1-25; p. 267, LL 1-5] Scott never said that he 
told Kym Freguson. Scott Harris testified that invoices from Pro Rental and Westem States were 
not being submitted for payment in a timely manner. When asked the following question, 
"There is nothing in the contract documents that says they're supposed to tum those in so you 
can pay them. They are supposed to pay their own, aren't they? Scott Harris answered: "1 think 
its in the subcontract agreement, paragraph - there's a paragraph that gives - oh, I think that you 
have read reviewed that they have, they have the obligation to pay their bills in a timely 
manner". [Tr. P. 259, LL 7-25; p. 260, LL 1-8] Scott harris tried to explain why he was 
requmng the Foxhollow's equipment suppliers to tum in their billings to Harris, but his 
testimony was confusing and contradictory. [Tr pp. 253 L-13 p. 260. L. 8] Scott Harris was 
unable to explain why Kym Ferguson is liable for a check [Exhibit ZZ] that Harris wrote to 
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Johnson on a payment request from Egan, Johnson's agent, for work that Scott HarTis says 
Johnson did. [Tr. P. 241, LIp. 244, L. 16] When Mr. Harris tried to explain the chain of 
events when he issued his check [Exibit ZZ] he became confused and finally said "1 don't know". 
Scott Harris could not keep track of what parties were representing what companies. 
Kym Ferguson did not know Foxhollow was submitting supplier invoices to Harris. In 
answer to the question: "Were you ever advised by Harris or anyone else that you were supposed 
to be turning your billings and invoices into Harris so that they could be paid"? Kym answered: 
"No". Kym did not expect Harris to pay his invoices, he was looking to FoxholIow. [Tr. p. 549, 
LL. 17-23] [Exhibit NN] Kym Ferguson could not have intentionally withheld billings from 
Harris when he did not know that billings were supposed to be turned in to Harris. 
As the Court pointed out "Contrary to Kym's alleged assertion to Robles, Kym, on behalf 
of Foxhollow, paid a number of suppliers and materialmen during August and September 2002 . 
[R. Vol. 6, p.1499] Kym Ferguson resigned as an officer withdrew from the corporation on 
September 24, 2002. [Ferguson Exhibits GG] and sold his stock that same day. [Ferguson 
Exhibits HH] Kym Ferguson testified that he only saw one billing from Pro-Rental in 
FoxhoIIow's office and he paid it. [Tr. p. 361. LL 7-12] and [Exhibit 32, page 92, 161] Kym 
went on to testify that the only other billings or invoices he had seen were the Ferguson Tntcking 
invoices for about $75,000.00. 
Even though Kym had access to the Foxhollow Checking account, he did not pay his own 
equipment rental (Ferguson Trucking) and actually paid some of Foxhollows IRS withholding 
taxes. [R. Vol 6, p. 1499 & 1501 Kym Ferguson testified that the only bill he sa\v from Pro-
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Rental he paid. [ When Kym got out of Foxhollow in September 2002 he was not aware of any 
outstanding billings to any other equipment supplier besides himself (Freguson Tntcking). [Tr. p. 
36J LLJ3-25; p. 362 LL J -14] Tony Robles testified that he was certain that the alleged 
conversation that he testified to took place on August 28, 2002, and that he logged the 
conversation but did not have the log and he could not produce it. [Tr. p. 45 J LI. 3-22] 
Therefore, Kym Ferguson could not have been referring to any billing except Ferguson 
Trucking's bilIing when the alleged conversation took place. Tony Robles testified that "They 
said that they were withholding any pay request submission or any billing until the job was 
complete by their, their scope of the work". [Tr. p. 453 LL 19-21] No explanation was offered as 
to who "they" were. Tony Robles testified that at some point he became aware that FoxhoIIow 
was not turning in some of the equipment billings. Tony Robles, nor anyone else, testified to 
when he became aware of this situation. This alleged conversation between Tony Robles and 
Kym Ferguson was presented to attempt to hold Kym Ferguson liable for the fraud that the 
Plaintiff claimed FoxhoIIow had committed in the perfonnance of FoxhoIIow's contract with 
Harris. The Plaintiff is attempting to reach Kym Ferguson through Foxhollo\v's contract based 
on the fact that D. Kym Ferguson was an officer in Foxhollow. 
Kym Ferguson was concerned because Foxhollow was not paying the equipment rental to 
Ferguson Trucking, so he took to signing the Foxhollow checks in order to try to find out what 
was happening, why he (Ferguson Trucking) was not being paid for his equipment. [Tr. p. 370 fl. 
20-25; p. 37 J, LI. J-3] In August and September of 2002 Kym was looking to Foxhollow for 
payment of Ferguson Trucking invoices, not Harris, Inc. Kym signed Foxhollow checks and 
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paid several supplier's invoices that had been turned into Foxhollow's office, (not to him) in 
August and September, including a Pro-Rental invoice. [R. Vol. 6, p. 1449; Plaintiff's Exhibit 32. 
at pp. 90,99-103-. 105-106, 109-115, 11 122, 124-135, 156 and 161] The Foxhollow Check 
No. 7708 payable to Pro-Rental, for $1,000.00 is dated August 23, 2002 and Check No. 7710 
payable to Les Schwab in the amount of$I,OOO.OO is dated August 26, 2002, [Exhibit 32 P. 100] 
two (2) days before Tony Robles alleged conversation with Kym Ferguson. Kym Freguson's 
alleged statement to Tony Robles was to have taken place in August 28, 2002. Kym Ferguson 
did not tum in the invoices from third party suppliers that were turned into Foxhollow's office in 
August and September, 2002. Instead, he paid them and other business expenses out of 
Foxhollow's business account. [R. Vol. 6, p. 1499; See Plaintiff's Exhibit 32, at pp 90, 99-1032, 
105-106,109-115, 117-122, 124-134, 156 and 161]. Kym Ferguson did not know that invoices 
and billing were supposed to be turned into Harris. No third party billings or invoices were 
turned into Kym, nor was he aware of any on August 28, 2002, that he did not pay on behalf of 
Foxhollow, except for the invoices from Ferguson Trucking. 
Tony Robles testified at the trial on behalf of the Plaintiff. [Tr. P.438, LL 10-18J He 
testified that he was employed by Harris as the Project superintendent. [Tr. P. 440, LI. 20-22J 
Mr. Robles testified that at some point in his acting as superintendent on the Fremont project, he 
became aware of problems pertaining to billings that had not been paid. and billings that had not 
been submitted in a timely manner by Foxhollow. [Tr. p. 444, LI. 21-25; p. 445 LI. 1-4J Tony 
Robles testified that after he became aware of this problem he had a conversation with D. Kym 
Ferguson on August 28,2002. [Tr. p. 446, LL 1-7; p. 451, LI. 1-13J Mr. Robles then testified 
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that "he said he was one of the principals in Foxhollow". [Tr. p. 452, II. 2-25;] Tony Robles 
then testified that Kym "said that they were withholding any pay request submission or billing 
until the job was complete by their, their scope of the work". [Tr. p. 453, II. 1-21/ When Tony 
Robles alleged that he had a conversation with Kym Ferguson on the 28th day of August. 2002, 
the plaintiff was trying to prove that Kym Ferguson was acting on behalf of Foxhollow in an 
attempt to impute Foxhollow's fraudulent conduct to Kym Ferguson. The Plaintiff failed to talk 
about which pay rcquests and billings Kym was referring to. The only unpaid pay requests and 
billing that Kyln Ferguson was aware of at that time were Ferguson Trucking's for renting 
equipment to Foxhollow for use on the Fremont Job. No matter how Tony Robles testimony is 
interpreted, and assuming, as the Court did, that if the conversation took place, Tony Robles, 
Harris' superintendent, said that he already knew that Foxhollow had not turned in all of their 
billings. The alleged statement attributed to Kym Ferguson was a straight forward answer and 
was simply a statement upon which Harris Inc was at liberty to act. [R. Vol 6, p. 1503] Kym 
Ferguson denies that the conversation took place. [Tr. 573, II. 1-25; p. 574 II. 1-25; p. 575, LL. 
1 -5] The question that Mr. Reece put to Tony Robles was prefaced with "after you became 
aware of this problem do you recall having a conversation with D. Kym Ferguson? Mr. Robles 
answered "yes". [Tr. p. 446, LL 4-7IJ 
The evidence presented clearly shows that Harris knew that billings and invoices had not 
been turned in prior to August 28th , 2002, the date of the alleged conversation between Tony 
Robles and KJ111 Ferguson but Harris continued to pay Foxhollow's payroll and equipment 
suppliers. HarTis paid Egan $1,570.00 on 9/6/2002 and $392.50 on 9/20/2002 without recording 
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any hours for payroll, and Harris paid Egan, $1,492.51 for 88 hrs on 9/612002 and $503.73 for 27 
11rs. on 9/20/2002 and Harris paid Voss' payroll on 9/612002 for $1,448.88 for 88 hrs. and on 
9120/2002 for 30 hrs Harris paid Voss $469.43. [Exhibit 52, p.14] On 12/5/2002, Harris issued 
its check No. 14270 payable to L & M Land Leveling and LN Johnson Paving Co. for $8,000.00. 
[Exhibit EJ Harris has taken the position that it would not have paid Johnson or Foxhollow ifit 
had known that the billings had not been turned in to Harris. [Harris' complain R-Vol 1. p. 6, 
par. 26; Tr P. 245, LL. 1-25; p. 246, LL 1-5] 
FINDINGS OF FACT [R. Vol. 6, pp. 1498 1500] 
The Court found: 
a. In its Complaint harris, Inc. premises its fraud claim against kym Fergusonupn, interalia, 
Egan's assurance to Scott Harris that all material and equipment bills incurred by Foxhollow or 
Johnson had been paid or submitted to Harris, Inc. At trial, Harris, [nco limited its claim against 
Fergusons to intentioanally withholding billings. Since this Court granted summary judgment in 
favor of Ferguson Farms and Mike Ferguson, this Court reviews only allegations of fraud as to 
Ky1D Ferguson. 
b. * * * From August through September 2002, Kym wrote checks from Foxhollow's 
corporate account for payment of loans, materialmen, supplies, employee payroll and employee 
reimbursement. 
c. During his tenure as Vice-President of Foxhollow, Kym (along with Mike invested 
approximately $70,000.00 in FoxHollow. Fergusons rented euipment to Foxhollowfor use on 
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the Fremont Project for vvhich Ferguson was never paid. That Ferguson Farms also paid some of 
Foxhollow's withholding taxes. 
d. During the Kyms tenure as tenure Vice-President of Foxhollow, Bessie Bradshaw 
served as Secretary/Treasurer of the corporation. She was also responsible for Foxhollow's 
accounting records. 
e. Kym did not work at the Fremont project at the beginning of the project. He did work at 
the construction projec at the "tail end" of the Fremont Project. 
f. According to Harris Inc., Kym had a discussion with Tony Robles toward the end of 
August at the Fremont Project Construction site. In that conversation, Kym allegedly told 
Robles that Foxhollow was intentionally its supplier invoices until the end of the Fremont 
Project. Kym dIsavowed any such discussion. 
g. Contrary to Kym's alleged assertion to Robles, Kym, on behalf of Foxhollow, paid a 
number of suppliers and materialmen during August and September 2002. In addition Scott 
Harris testified that Egan brought in billings, Payroll records and any expense incurred by 
Foxhollow on the Fremont Project, showed the documentation to Scott (by facximile or through 
"Cindy" , an office employee of Harris. Inc.), filled out a summary sheet, and then received 
progress payments paylnents from Harris, Inc. (Scott did not specify the date or dates when 
Egan turned over these billing to H arrris, Inc.) Scott also testified that Harris, Inc. made 
payments directly to supplicrs on the Foshollow and Johnson subcontracts. Robles testified that 
he received som Foxhollow billings and incs from Egan. Again, the evidence does not reflect 
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which invoices Egan turned over to Harris Inc. or when Harris, Inc. paid Foxhollow billings and 
lIlvolces. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW [R. Vol. 6, pp 1501 ~ 1503J 
The Court concluded: 
a. Corporate directors are not liable, merely by virtue of their office, 
for fraud or other tortuous wrongdoing committed by the Corporation or its officers. 
Instead, to be held liable a corporate director must specifically direct actively participate in or not 
knowingly acquiesce in the fraud or other wrongdoing of the Corporation or its officers. 
b. A party must establish nine (9) elements to prove fraud: "1) a statement or a 
representation of fact; 2) its falsity; 3) its materiality; 4) the speaker's knowledgc of its falsity; 5) 
the speakers intend that there be reliance; 6) the hearers i§,'llorance of the falsity of the statement; 
7) reliance by the hearer; 8) justifiable reliance; and 9) result in injury." 
c. The evidence reflects that Foxhollow was poorly organized and managed from as 
early as November of 2001. Both Egan and Voss handled equipment rental receipts on the 
Fremont Project and turned them into Tony Robles. Bessie Bradshaw, the Secretary/Treasurer of 
Foxhollow and a construction accountant with thirty five (35) years of experience, had little 
control over Foxhollow's cost billings for the Fremont Project Kym Ferguson took over the 
Foxhollow corporate checkbook in August and September of 2002 and paid a number of payroll, 
reimbursement and supplier costs on the Fremont Project, including a check to Pro-Rentals. 
None of the directors or employees of Foxhollow appear to have much control over the 
materialmen and/or supplier invoices. Despite Bradshaw's skills, Foxhollow did not appear to 
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have a system for tracking supplier or materialmen invoices. Fox hollow's failure to alert Harris 
Inc. regarding unpaid supplier invoices was material that such information was an important 
element in detennining Harris Inc.'s course of action on the Jefferson and Fremont construction 
Projects. 
Foxhollow new or should have known that any assurances or silence about unpaid 
invoices was false and that Harris Inc. would rely upon Foxhollow's assurances or silence about 
supplier invoices 
As a subcontractor of Harris Inc., Foxhollow intended Harris Inc. to rely upon its 
communications (or silence) with regard to supplier invoices. 
Harris Inc. was not aware of the Pro-Rentals or Western States invoices until September 
16, 2002 and September 18, 2002, respectively. Despite this knowledge, Harris Inc.t paid 
payroll for Foxhollow on September 20, 2002. On December 5, 2000 to Harris Inc. paid another 
supplier which Harris Inc. attributed to Johnson subcontract who was apparently hired by 
Foxhollow (since Johnson never actually worked on the Fremont Project). Thus, the evidence 
does not substantiate that Harris Inc. relied upon Foxhollow's assurances or silence to its 
detriment. (Empasis added) 
d. In addition to a lack of sufficient evidence to Harris Inc.'s reliance upon 
Foxhollow's assurances or silence, Harris Inc. has not shown sufficient evidence that Kym 
Ferguson specifically directed, actively participate in or knowingly acquiesced in fraud by 
Foxhollow. If Kim's alleged statement to Tony Robles is true, then Kym was not fraudulently 
withhoiding invoices from Harris Inc. Instead he was explaining to Harris Inc. that Foxhollow 
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intended to withhold its invoices until the completion of the Fremont Project. On that 
information, Harris was then at liberty to withhold payments to Foxhollow on the Fremont 
Project, including payroll payments to Egan and Voss. Despite Robles testimony that his 
conversation with Kym took place in the last days of August 2002, Harris Inc. continued to make 
Foxhollow's payroll payments to Egan and Voss in September of 2002. Kim's statement does 
not ~yince specific direction of, active participation in or knowing acquiescence to fraud. 
(Emphasis Added) Instead it was a straightforward comment upon which Harris Inc. was at 
liberty to act. 
e. Based on the foregoing conclusions, this Court finds no evidence upon which to hold 
Kym Ferguson liable for fraud, based upon Harris Inc.'s allegation of fraud against Foxhollow. 
Accordingly, Harris Inc., shall take nothing by its fraud claim against Kym Ferguson. 
ISSSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. DID THE COURT ERR IN RULING HARRIS FAILED TO PROVE DAMAGES. 
2. DID THE COURT ERR IN REFUSING TO AWARD DAMAGES ON THE 
GROUNDS THAT THE EVIDENCE DID NOT SHOW WHETHER THE DAMAGES 
WERE A RESULT OF THE JOHNSON CONTRACT OR THE FOXHOLLOW 
CONTRACT, OR BOTH. 
In response to the Claims of Error number 1 and 2 (Points One and Two) by the Appellant, 
Ferguson adopts by reference the pages 15-19 including paragraph A, set forth in Reponsent 
Johnson's Respondent's Brief filed herein. LA.R Rule 35(a)(7)(g). 
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3. DID THE COURT ERR IN FINDING THAT THE PAYMENTS HARRIS SENT TO 
JOHNSON WERE NOT FOR JOHNSON'S WORK ON THE REMONT PROJECT. 
In response to the Claims of Error number 3.(Point Three) by the Appellant, Ferguson adopts by 
reference paragraph B on pages 19~20, set forth in Reponsent Johnson's Respondent's Brief 
filed herein. I.A.R Rule 35(a)(7)(g). 
4. DID THE COURT ERR IN HOLDING HARRIS FAILED TO PROVE THE GENERAL 
CONDITIONS WERE A PART OF THE SUBCONTRACT WITH JOHNSON AND 
FOXHOLLOW AND IN DENYING INDEMNIFICATION TO HARRIS 
In response to the Claims of Error number 4. (Point Four) by the Appellant, Ferguson 
adopts by reference Paragraph C on pages 20-21 set forth in Reponsent Johnson's Respondent's 
Brief filed herein. LA.R Rule 35(a)(7)(g). 
5. See below. 
6. DID THE COURT ERR IN REFUSING TO ADMIT ESHIBIT 55!55-A? 
In response to the Claim of Error number 6 (Point 6) by the Appellant, Ferguson adopts 
by reference paragraph D on pages 21~23 set forth in Reponsent Johnson's Respondent's Brief 
filed herein. LA.R Rule 35(a)(7)(g). 
7. DID THE COURT ERR IN DENYING HARRIS' MOTION TO AMEND FINDINGS 
AND CONCLUSIONS? 
In response to the Claim of Error number 7 (Point Seven) by the Appellant, Ferguson 
adopts by reference paragraph E on page 23 set forth in Reponsent Johnson's Respondent's Brief 
filed herem. I.A.R Rule 35(a)(7)(g). 
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8 DID THE COURT ERR IN AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES AND COURT COSTS 
TO JOHNSON AGAINST HARRIS? 
In response to the Claim of Error number 8 (Point Eight) by the Appellant, Ferguson 
adopts by reference paragraph F on pages 23-25 set forth in Reponsent Johnson's Respondent's 
Brief filed herein. I.A.R Rule 35(a)(7)(g). 
9. See below. 
10. DID THE COURT ERR IN DENYING HARRIS' MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
In who response to the Claims of Error number 10 (Point 10) by the Appellant, Ferguson 
adopts by reference paragraph G on pages 25~26, set forth in Reponsent Johnson's Respondent's 
Brief filed herein. LA.R Rule 35(a)(7)(g). 
11. THE RESPONDENT, FERGUSON IS ENTITLE TO, AND DOES REQUEST, 
ATTORNEY FEES AND COURT COSTS INCURRED IN THIS APPEAL 
PURSUANT TO I.A.R. 41 AND I.e. 12-120(3). 
See below for response to Additional claim on appeal, No. 11. 
6. DID THE COURT ERR IN NOT AWARDING DAMAGES AGAINST 
FERGUSON? 
Responding to Appellant's claim of error number 6, Denial of Damages against 
Fergusonisprope~ 
AUTHORITIES 
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It is an established principle of corporations law that corporate directors are not 
liable merely by virtue of their office for fraud or other tortuous wrongdoing 
committed by the Corporation or its officers. Instead, to be held liable a corporate 
director must specifically direct, actively participate in or knowinglv acquiesce in 
the fraud or other wrongdoing of the Corporation or its officers. Emphasis 
Added. 
YEP VC v. Dakota Co., 141 Idaho 326, 334, 109 P.3d 714, 723 (S CT) 2005 
"Silence may constitute fraud when a duty to disclose exists. (Citations Omitted) 
a party may be under a duty to disclose: (1) if there is a fiduciary or other similar 
relation of trust and confidence between the two parties; (2) in order to prevent a 
partial statement of the facts from being misleading; (3) if a fact known to one 
party and not the other is so vital that that if the mistake were mutual the contract 
would be voidable, and the party knowing the fact also knows that the other party 
does not know it. 
Sowards v. Rathbun, 134 Idaho 702, 707, 8 P.3d 1245, 1251 (S Ct) 2000 
"As the District Court stated, the party alleging intentional misrepresentation or 
fraud as the burden of proving the elements of fraud by clear and convincing 
evidence.G & M Famls v. Funk irrigationCo., 119 Idaho 514, 808 P.2d851 (1991, 
whether the required burden of proof on a particular issue has been met is a 
question for the trier of fact to decide in the first instance in as much as the Court 
has primary responsibility for weiging evidence. County of Canyon v. Wilkerson, 
123 idaho 377, 848 P.2d 435 (Ct. App. 1993) the trial court's detem1ination that a 
claim has not been proven is entitled to great weight on appeal. Id. this courts 
review of a trial court's decision is limited to ascertaining whether the evidence 
supports the findings of fact and whether the findings of fact support the 
conclusions of law. Conley v. Whittlesey, 133 Idaho 265, 985 P.2d 1127 (1999; 
A/umet v. Bear Lake Grazing Co., 1J9Idhoa 946, 812 P.2d 253 (1991). The 
Supreme Court may not set aside a trial court's findings of fact unless they are 
clearly erroneous, this is, unless the challenged finding is not supported by 
substantial competent evidence. I.R.C.P. 52(a); State , Dept. of Health and 
Welfare, ex rei. Osburn v. Altman, 122 Idaho 1004, 812 P.2d 683 (1992) the 
substantial evidence standard for appellate review requires a greater quantum of 
evidence in cases where the trial court's findings must be supported by clear and 
convincing evidence, then in cases where mere preponderance is required. in 
interest of hush, 113 idaho 873, 749 P.2d. 492 (1988). When reviewing the trial 
court's findings of fact in a case in which the facts must be established by clear 
and convincing evidence, the job of the reviewing court is simply to detelmine 
whether there is substantial and competent evidence to sustain the finding. 
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Christensen v. nelson, 125 Idaho 663,873 P.2d 917 (Ct.App. 1994); Kreiensieck 
v. Cook, 108 Idaho 657, 701 P.2d 277 (Ct.App. 1985). 
Sowards v. Raathhufl, 134 Idaho 702, 706,707, 8 P.3d 1245, 1249, 1250. 
ARGUMENT 
Tony Robles testified at the trial on behalf of the Plaintiff. [Tr. P.438, LL 10-18} He 
testified that he was employed by Harris as the Project superintendent. [Tr. P. 440, LL 20~221 
Mr. Robles testified that at some point in his acting as superintendent on the Fremont project, he 
became aware of problems pertaining to billings that had not been paid. and billings that had not 
been submitted in a timely manner by Foxhollow. [Tr. p. 444, LL 21-25; p. 445 LL 1-4} Tony 
Robles testified that after he became aware of this problem he had a conversation with D. 
Kym Ferguson on August 28,2002. [Tr. p. 446, IL 1-7; p. 451, LL 1-J3} Mr. Robles then 
testified that "he said he was one of the principals in Foxhollow". [Tr. p. 452, LL 2-25;] Tony 
Robles then testified that Kym "said that they were withholding any pay request submission or 
billing until the job was complete by their, their scope of the work". [Tr. p. 453, LL 1-21} 
When Tony Robles alleged that he had a conversation with Kym Ferguson on the 28th day of 
August. 2002, the plaintiff was trying to prove that Kym Ferguson was acting on behalf of 
Foxhollow in an attempt to impute Foxhollow's fraudulent conduct to Kym Ferguson. The 
Plaintiff failed to talk about which pay requests and billings Kym was referring to. The only 
unpaid pay requests and billing that Kym Ferguson was aware of at that time were Ferguson 
Trucking' was renting equipment to Foxhollow for use on the Fremont Job. No matter how 
Tony Robles testimony is interpreted, and assuming, as the Court did, that if the conversation 
took place, Tony Robles, Harris' superintendent, said that he already knew that Foxhollow had 
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not turned in all of their billings. The alleged statement attributed to Kym Ferguson was a 
straight forward answer and was simply a statement upon which Harris Inc was at liberty to act . 
[R. Vol 6, p. 1503] Kym Ferguson denies that the conversation took place. [Tr. 573, LL.1-25; p. 
5 LL. 1-25: p. 575, LL. 1-5] The question that Mr. Reece put to Tony Robles was prefaced 
with "after you became aware of this problem do you recall having a conversatiou with D. 
Kym Ferguson? Mr. Robles answered "yes". [Tr. p. 446, LL 4-71] 
On August 28, 2002, the date of the alleged conversation that Tony Robles testified to, 
Kym Ferguson did not Know that billings and invoices were supposed to be turned into Harris. 
When Kym Ferguson resigned his office in Foxhollow and sold his stock on September 24, 
2002, Kym did not know that billings and invoices were supposed to be turned into Harris. 
There is no evidence in the record that Kym Ferguson withheld any billings and invoices from 
Harris, except the invoices from Ferguson Trucking that he turned into Foxhollow. The alleged 
conversation between Robles and Ferguson was presented in an attempt to show that Kym 
Ferguson, acting as Foxxhollow's director had intentionally withheld billings for equipment 
rental due to Western States and Pro Rental and thereby imputing Foxhollow's fraud to Kym 
Ferguson. Kym Ferguson did not know that Western States and Pro-Rental's billings had not 
been turned into Harris. The only billing Kym saw in Foxhollow's office, when he was signing 
checks in August and September of 2002, was one billing from Pro-Rental and on August 23, 
2002, he paid it from Foxhollow's checking account with Check No. 7706. If Foxhollow was 
intentionally withholding billings from Pro-Rental, he certainly would not have paid Pro Rental 
on August 23, 2002. If Foxhollow was intentionally withhold in 3rd party billings and invoices 
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in accord with Robles statement, Egan would not have been turning in invoices or payroll. All 
billings and invoices would have stopped. 
The evidence presented clearly shows that Harris knew that some billings and invoices 
had not been turned in prior to August 28th , 2002, the date of the aIleged conversation between 
Tony Robles and Kym Ferguson but Harris continued to pay Foxhollow's payroll and equipment 
suppliers after Kym's alleged statement Harris paid Egan $1,570.00 without any notation of hrs., 
and paid Egan $1,492.51 for 88 hrs. on 9/6/2002. Harris paid Voss on 9/6 12002 $ 1,448.88 for 
88 hrs. Harris received written demand for payment of equipment rental from Pro-Rental in the 
amount of$8,000.00 on September 16,2002 and from Western States in the amount $51,000.00. 
At anytime after Harris became aware of unpaid invoices that had not been turned in by 
Foxhollow or Johnson, Harris could have refused to pay any more of Foxhollow's or Johnson's 
expenses, but Harris went ahead and paid Egan, $503.73 for 27 hrs. on 9/20/2002, and Harris 
paid Voss' $469.43 for 30 hours payroll on 9/20/2002. [Exhibit 52, p.14] On 12/5/2002, in 
addition, Harris issued its check No. 14270 payable to L & M Land Leveling and LN Johnson 
Paving Co. for $8,000.00. on 12/05/2002 for equipment rented by Foxhollow. [Exhibit E] Harris 
has taken the position that it would not have paid Johnson or Foxhollow if it had known that the 
billings had not been turned in to Harris and bases Harris' claim for fraud against Foxhollow on 
Dave Egan's statement that "all of the bills were paid" [Harris' complain R-VoI1. p. 6, par. 26; 
Tr P. 245, LL. 1-25; p. 246, LL 1-5] but after the alleged statement by Kym and after the actual 
\vritten demands for payment from Pro-Rental and Western States, Harris made the above listed 
payments of Foxhollow's payroll and equipment suppliers. Harris did not rely on Kym 
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Ferguson's alleged statement to its detriment. HatTis has not proven that Ferguson knew that the 
Egan's statement was made nor that the billings and invoices were supposed to be turned into 
harris. Therefore, Harris failed to prove that Kym knew of the falsity of either any 
misrepresentation or Harris' reliance on his silence. This is a failure to prove the 4th element 
Fraud, the speaker's knowledge of its falsity. The evidence shows that Harris failed 
to prove that Harris relied on Foxhollow's failure to tum in billings to its detriment, and 
therefore did not prove the i h, element of Fraud. (reliance) or the 9th element (resultant injury) 
and Harris did not rely on Kym Ferguson's alleged statement, nor did Harris prove that Kym 
knew that the billings had not been turned in. Kym Ferguson's aIleged statement, if he made it, 
it was a statement of what Harris already believed to be the truth. Harris failed to prove damages 
against FoxholImv, nor reliance on Foxhollow's silence which is fatal to proving Fraud against 
Foxhollow. If there was no fraud proven against FoxholIow, there is no fraud to impute to Kym 
Ferguson as a director or officer ofFoxholIow. 
9 THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES 
AND COSTS TO FERGUSON 
AUTHORITIES 
IRCP Rule 54( d)(l )(B). Costs Items allowed 
Respondent Ferguson's Respondents's Brief 23 
(A) Parties Entitled to Costs. Except when otherwise limited by these rules, costs 
shall be allowed as a matter of right to the prevailing party or parties, unless 
otherwise ordered by the Court. 
(8) Costs. Except when otherwise limited by these rules, costs shall be allowed 
as a matter of right to the prevailing party or parties, unless otherwise ordered 
by the Court. 
(C) Prevailing Party. In detennining which party is a prevailing party and entitled 
to costs, the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the final judgment 
or result of the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties. 
The trial court in its sound discretion may detennine that a party to an action 
prevailed in pali and did not prevail in part, and upon so finding may 
apPoliion the costs between and among the parties in a fair and equitable 
manner after considering all of the issues and claims involved in the action 
and the resultant judgment or judgments obtained. 
IRCP 54( e)( 1). Attorney fees 
In any civil action the Court may award reasonable attorney fees, 
which at the discretion of the court may include paralegal fees, to the 
prevailing party or parties as defined in Rule 54(d)(1)(B), when provided for 
by any statute or contract. Provided, attorney fees under 12-121, Idaho Code, 
may be awarded by the Court only when it finds, from the facts presented to it, 
that the case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or 
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without foundation; but attorney fees shall not be awarded pursuant to section 1 
121, Idaho Code, on a default judgment. 
IRCP RULE 54(d)(5) Memorandum of Costs 
At any time after the verdict of a jury or a decision of the court, any party 
who claims costs may file and serve on the adverse parties a memorandum of 
costs, itemizing each claimed expense, but such memorandum of costs may not be 
filed later than fourteen (14) days after the entry of judgment. Such memorandum 
must state that to the best of the party's knowledge and belief the items are correct 
and that the costs claimed are in compliance with this rule. Failure to file such 
memorandum of costs within the period prescribed by this rule shall be a waiver 
of the right of costs. A memorandum of costs prematurely filed shall be 
considered timely. 
I.C. 12-120 ATTORNEY FEES IN CIVIL ACTIONS. 
* * * 
(3) In any civil action to recover on an open account stated, note, bill, 
negotiable instrument, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of goods, wares, 
merchandise, or services and in any commercial transaction unless otherwise 
provided by law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable 
attorney's fee to be set by the Court, to be taxed and collected as costs. 
BIimka v. My Web Wholesaler, LLC, 143 Idaho 723, 152 P. 3d. 594 
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The term "commercial transaction" is defined to mean all 
transactions except for personal or household purposes. The term party is 
defined to mean any person, partnership, corporation, association, private 
organization. the state of Idaho or a political subdivision thereof. (Emphasis 
added) 
The Idaho Supreme Court has ruled on the interpretation of I.C. 1 120(3) in 
Blimka v. My Web Wholesaler, LLC, 143 Idaho 723, 152 P.3d 594, 599-600 
(S.Ct. 2007) 
"Commercial transaction has been defined as "all transactions except transactions 
for personal or household purposes." I.C. 12-120(3). An award of attorney fees 
under I.C. 12-120(3) is proper if "the commercial transaction is integral to the 
claim, and constitutes the basis upon which the party is attempting to recover." 
(citations omitted) 
"A transaction involving the sale of 26,500 pairs of jeans is not for personal or 
household purposes. Rather, it is a business or commercial transaction, as Blimka 
obviously intended to market the jeans rather than wear them. From time to time 
the Court has denied fees under I.e. 12-120(3) on the commercial transaction 
ground either because the claim sounded in tort or because no contract was 
involved. The commercial transaction ground in I.C. 120(3) neither 
prohibits a fee award for a commercial transaction that involves tortuous 
conduct (see Lettunich v. Key Balik Nat 'I Ass'n, 141 Idaho 362, 369, 109 P.3d 
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1104, 1111 (205», nor does it require that there be a contract. Any previous 
holdings to the contrary are overruled. We hold that Blimka is entitled to a fee 
award on appeal with respect to his fraud claim, as he is seeking recovery of 
damages sustained as a result of the commercial transaction involved in this 
case." Blirnka v. My Web Wholsaler 143 Idaho 723, (Emphasis added) 
ARGUMENT 
PREVAILING PARTY IRCP 54(d)(l) 
The Court granted Summary Judgment in favor of Ferguson Farms and Michael 
Ferguson on all of Harris's claims. None of Hamis's claims against Ferguson Farms and 
Michael Ferguson were pursued at trial on the merits. [R-1498] The Court states that "At Trial 
Harris, Inc., limited it's fraud claim against Fergusons to intentional withholding of 
billings. Since the Court granted summary judgment in favor of Ferguson Farms and Mike 
Ferguson, this Court reviews only the allegation of Fraud as to Kym Ferguson.". [R. Vol. 6, p. 
1498] Harris has not appealed from the Summary Judgment Order of the Court. [R-1557], 
Amended Notice of Appeal. [R-1557] 
Fergusons have prevailed entirely upon Harris' claims. [R. Vol. 6, p1548] Prior to trial, Harris 
Inc. dismissed its contract-based claims against Fergusons. Immediately after trial Mike 
Ferguson and Ferguson Farms prevailed by summary judgment over Harris lnc.'s remaining 
fraud and unjust enrichment claims. At the trial Kym Ferguson in his capacity as a former officer 
in Foxhollow successfully defended against Harris Inc.'s attempts to pierce Foxhollow's 
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corporate veil and place liability on him individually and Kym Ferguson prevailed as well on 
Harris' Claim against Kym Ferguson for fraud based on Foxhollow's fraud that they alleged was 
chargable to Kym Ferguson by claiming Kym Ferguson, as a director and officer of Foxhollow, 
specifically dIrected, actively participated in or knowingly acquiesced in the fraud commited by 
Foxhollow.[R. Vol. 6, p. 1506] 
HARRIS PREVAILED ON FERGUSON'S COUNTERCLAIM. 
"The Fergusons alleged that they sent two (2) letters and a stipulation of dismissal of the 
counterclaim to Harris, Inc. prior to trial with no response. Harris Inc. did not refute this 
argument. Indeed, the record reflects a letter from Fergusons attorney, William Mulberry, dated 
October 20, 2006 declaring the Fergusons intent to drop their counterclaim. Mulberry also 
submitted a blank "stipulation to dismiss counterclaim" which he hand-delivered on July 15, 
2008 to Council for Harris Inc. Mulberry did not charge for his time spent preparing either of 
these documents. Furthern10re, in their pretrial memorandum, the Fergusons notified the Court 
and Harris Inc. that they had abandoned their counterclaim. Thus, the Fergusons counterclaim 
was a live issue only from the date the Fergusons filed their answer (December 22, 2005) until 
Mulberry gave Harris Inc. notice of intent to withdraw the counterclaim (October 20, 2006). 
Although the counterclaim issue is fairly minor, Kym Ferguson knew that he had signed 
a release with Harris Inc. over money allegedly owed to Ferguson trucking for finishing work 
perforn1ed on the Fremont Project The Fergusons counterclaim against Harris Inc. was 
frivolous. Those amounts of attorney time spent by Mulberry on the counterclaim shall be 
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deducted from Fergusons fee award. [R. Vol. 6, pp 1541& 1542] Harris prevailed on Summary 
Judgment on Ferguson's Counterclim, [R. Vol. 6 p ,1542] 
COURTS DETERMINATIONAND AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES TO FERGUSON. 
"The Fergusons prevailed entirely upon Harris Inc.'s claims, including the claim for 
unj ust enrichment" [R. V 01 6 p. 1505] As discussed above, the hours spent on the counterclaim, 
which Kym Ferguson knew or should have known was a frivolous issues in light of the release 
agreement he signed with Harris Inc., shall be deducted from the overall fees requested by 
Fergusons. (R. Vol. 6, p.1548) "since the Fergusons' attorney, Mr. Mulberry, did not break out 
the amount of time spent specifically on the counterclaim issue, the entire charge connected to 
the counterclaim shall be deducted from the total attorney fee requested. No other entries by Mr. 
Mulberry are questionable. 
FERGUSON COMPLIED WITH IRCP 54(e)(3) 
Harris claims that counsel for Fergusons had to address each of the factors listed in IRCP 
54( e)(3). These factors are not requiremens for counsel to address, they are factors for the Court 
to consider in making a fee award. As set above, the Court did consider all of the factors set 
forth in IRCP S4(e)(3). And awarded Ferfuson $33,232,50 in Attorney Fees and $858.32 in costs 
as a matter of right. (R. Vol.6,p1552] 
Plaintiffraises the issue of Defendant's failure to comply with IRCP Rule 54( e)(3) by 
addressing in Defendant's, Memorandum of Costs (R. Vol. 6, 1319] and Supporting Affidavit, 
[R. Vol 6, 1322] each of the factors that the Court is to consider in making a deternlination of an 
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allmvance of attorney fees. Harris failed to raise this issue in its Motion to Amend Finding and 
Conclusions of Law and for New Trial, or his brief in support thereof, or in his objection to 
Defendant's Motion for Allowance of Attorney fees and his brief in supp0l1 thereof, or in his 
Notice of Appeal, or any other pleading filed prior to his Appellant's Brief. 
Ferguson's Memorandum of Costs and Supporting Affidavit comply with Rule 54 as 
required. The Affidavit, setting out the time and Charges states that "The charges for Counsel's 
services are reasonable and are equal to or less than the prevailing charges for similar services." 
[R. Va!. 6, pi323] The said Affidavit in support of Memorandum of Costs sets out the time and 
charges and was provided as required by the Rule [IRe? 54(e)(3]), and the Court found that Mr. 
MulbelTy's experience and expertise warrants the $150.00 per hour fee rate that he charged 
Fergusons. The Affidavit submitted by Mr. mulberry was considered by the Court and was 
described as having "exacting detail" and shows a logical and methodical approach to the case. 
The court noted that the claims against the Fergusons were fairly complex, in that they involved 
legal theories of partnership liability, pircing the corporate veil, corporate officer fraud and the 
Fergusons' relationship and actions as agent of foxhollow. The C0U11 noted that the case was 
document-intensive. Mr. Mulberry's hours spent on the matter were reasonable under the 
circumstances. [R. vol6, pi549] 
The Court does not operate in a Vacuum, nor does the trial judge have blinders on. The 
trial judge brings with him, his knowledge, expertise and expenences and in making his 
detenninations on an award of attorney fees, he can draw on that knowledge, expertise and 
experiences to arrive at the award of attorney fees. The Trial Court had ample opportunity to 
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observe counsel and his perfonnance in the presentation of the case. The Court specifically 
listed the factors that the Court should consider in determining an award of attorney fees. [IRe? 
54(e)(3) The Court considered all of the factors listed in IRCP Rule 54(e)(3) in arriving at its 
decision on an award of attorney fees to Fergusons. [R. vol. 6, p. 1545 - 1546] The Court is not 
required to make findings with regard to each of the factors listed in IRCP 54( e )(3). 
The Court found that the Fergusons, as predominantly prevailing party, are entitled to 
recover their attorney fees. [R. Vol. 6. p.J550] The Court Considered IRCP 54(d)(I)(B) and 
54(d)(l)(C) and discussed the requirements for awarding discretionary costs. [R. Vol. 6, pJ550-
1551] 
THE RELEASE AGREEMENT DOES NOT PROHIBIT THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY 
FEES. 
The Court considered Harris' argument with regard to the "Release Agreement" and found that 
the Release agreement was not concerning Foxhollow. The release agreement pel1ained to 
damages arising in any way out of any work perfonned by the undersigned (Ferguson) at those 
certain construction projects in Rigby, Idaho (Jefferson Joint School District 251) and Ashton, 
Idaho (north Fremont High School) in which the undersigned and the releasees were involved. 
The alleged fraud perpetrated by Foxhollow for which Harris is trying to hold Ferguson 
liable due to his being a director and officer in Foxhollow and claiming that he specifically 
directed, actively participated in, or knowingly acquiescenced in the Fraud allegedly committed 
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bv Foxhollow. The claim has nothing to do with work that Fergusons performed on the 
Jefferson or North Fremont Projects. 
"The fraud alleged against Ferguson is directly tied to the Foxhollow contract \vith 
Harris. When Harris Inc. attempted to reach through the Foxhollow contract to capture 
Fergusons, it did so at the risk of incurring attorney fees by Ferguson if it did not prevail" [R. 
Vol. 6, P 1544] that contingency occurred, and Harris, Inc. Cannot hide behind a release 
agreement he forged with the Fergusons for the work the Fergusons preformed at Harris Inc.'s 
request, and they separate, oral agreement between Harris, Inc. and the Fergusons. [R. Vol. 6, p 
1544] The contract with Foxhollow is the gravaman of the case is a commercial transaction, and 
the fact that it involves a tort is not fatal to the claim for Attorney Fees. The basis for the claim 
or defense does not have to be based on a contract. Blimka v. My Web Wholesaler, supra. 
11. RESPONDENT, FERGUSON, IS ENTITLED TO, AND DOES REQUEST 
ATTORNEY FEES AND COURT COSTS INCURRED IN THIS APPEAL 
PURSUANT TO I.A.R. 41 AND I.C. 12-120(3). 
The prevailing party upon appeasl is enti tIed to Attorney fees as a matter of right pursuant to 
I.A.R. 41 aad I.e. 12-120(3). 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 30th day of Sept~l1l!~·-"'1 
./ 
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